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Abstract 35 
Biodiversity offsets (‘offsets’) are an increasingly widespread conservation tool. Often, 36 
offset policies have a like-for-like requirement, whereby permitted biodiversity losses 37 
must be offset by gains in similar ecosystem components. Some have suggested that 38 
flexibility might be desirable (e.g. out-of-kind offsets, that channel compensation 39 
towards priority species, potentially using conservation budgets more efficiently). But 40 
there has been little formal exploration of different types of flexibility, and the possible 41 
ecological consequences. 42 
 43 
Building upon an existing framework for analysing conservation interventions, we first 44 
categorise types of flexibility relevant to offsetting. We then explore flexibility using an 45 
offset simulation model. This non-spatial model tracks biodiversity value (‘habitat 46 
condition’ x area) over time, for multiple vegetation communities. We simulate offset 47 
policies that are flexible in time (i.e. offsets implemented before or after development) 48 
and flexible in type (i.e. losses in one habitat compensated for by gains in another). 49 
 50 
Our categorisation of flexibility in offsetting identifies categories previously not 51 
explicitly considered during policy development. We demonstrate, using model 52 
outputs, that flexibility can have material ecological consequences. Simulated offsets 53 
that were flexible in time resulted in biodiversity declines happening sooner or later 54 
than they would otherwise – important, as conservation priorities change with time. 55 
Flexibility in type resulted in the relative threat status of different habitat types 56 
changing. 57 
 58 
We emphasize the importance of considering the full spectrum of flexibility in 59 
biodiversity offsets during policy development. As offset policies become increasingly 60 
prevalent, insufficient consideration of the consequences of flexibility could lead to 61 
undesirable biodiversity outcomes. 62 
63 
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1. Introduction 64 
1.1 Biodiversity offsetting 65 
Biodiversity offsets (henceforth ‘offsets’) have emerged as an important tool in 66 
conservation practice worldwide (Madsen et al., 2011), and continue to form part of 67 
policy development in an increasing number of geographical regions (e.g. Tucker et 68 
al., 2013; Saenz et al., 2013). Offset policies fundamentally involve exchanging 69 
biodiversity losses for equivalent gains, with the objective that ‘no net loss’ of 70 
biodiversity is achieved overall alongside development. Whilst this premise might 71 
seem simple, it gives rise to a range of complications (Bull et al., 2013a). Not least of 72 
these is that ‘biodiversity’ is itself a vague concept, and any measure of biodiversity 73 
as a whole (which can be defined as the “sum total of all biotic variation from the 74 
level of genes to ecosystems”) cannot be based upon a single number or metric 75 
(Purvis & Hector, 2000). Indeed, the concept of complementarity (Kukkala and 76 
Moilanen 2013), central to systematic conservation planning, implies that all different 77 
components of biodiversity should be catered for individually. Thus, in creating 78 
policies that aim for no measurable net loss of biodiversity, and consequently 79 
developing metrics to evaluate success, we must accept that these metrics will not 80 
capture every element of biodiversity at a site and therefore, fundamentally, remain 81 
only surrogate measures for biodiversity as a whole. 82 
 83 
Current best-practice recommendations for implementing offsets suggest that they 84 
should be “in-kind” (BBOP, 2012; IFC, 2012), meaning that the gains from the 85 
biodiversity offset are for the same or very similar biodiversity components to those  86 
impacted. In practice, no two components of biodiversity (e.g. individuals of a given 87 
species, areas of the same habitat type) are ever precisely equivalent and fungible 88 
(Salzman & Ruhl, 2000). Thus all offsets are technically “out-of-kind” to some degree. 89 
But the simplifying assumption is made that trades that can be shown to be similar 90 
enough in terms of either overall biological diversity, or in terms of associated 91 
ecosystem functions, can be treated as equivalent (Quétier & Lavorel, 2012). 92 
 93 
1.2 Flexibility in biodiversity offsets 94 
In some cases, out-of-kind offsets (e.g. those that allow ‘flexible’ trade in biodiversity 95 
components) might be preferable, by allowing offsets to focus upon the priority 96 
conservation species within a region in a cost-effective manner (Wilcox & Donlan, 97 
2007; Habib et al., 2013). To elaborate, Habib et al. (2013) found using a Canadian 98 
example that non-flexible offset policies required 2 – 17 times more funding to 99 
achieve the same conservation objectives as flexible offsets; and Wilcox & Donlan 100 
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(2007) found that a flexible offset mechanism was 23 times more effective at 101 
achieving the objective of invasive predator removal than other approaches. 102 
 103 
It should be noted that what we call flexibility in this context has been called by other 104 
names elsewhere. For example, consider the terms ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ sustainability, 105 
which have been used in ecological economics and green accounting (Gowdy 2000; 106 
Dietz & Neumayer 2007). In biodiversity offsetting, these terms have been used to 107 
indicate the degree to which different biodiversity components can be exchanged – 108 
e.g. levels of ‘sustainability’ (i.e. flexibility) permitted in the newly developed ‘RobOff’ 109 
software range from treating different biodiversity components as completely fungible 110 
(i.e. weak sustainability) through to requiring no loss in any one biodiversity 111 
component (i.e. strong sustainability) (Pouzols & Moilanen 2013). The terms 112 
‘substitutability’, ‘interchangeability’, ‘replaceability’, and ‘fungibility’ also link to 113 
flexibility, and have been used in various contexts (Parris & Kates, 2003; Dietz & 114 
Neumayer, 2007). 115 
 116 
From a policy perspective, offsets are considered flexible in relation to a number of 117 
different policy characteristics. Offsets could involve the trade of one component or 118 
type of biodiversity for a different type (i.e. flexibility by type), or, for offset sites that 119 
are distant in space from the development for which they provide compensation (i.e. 120 
flexibility in space). Implicitly, permitting flexibility in time is also commonly discussed 121 
– e.g. by allowing time lags between development impacts and gains from associated 122 
offsets – although this is not generally explicitly recognized as a form of flexibility, 123 
and is allowed by many policies. 124 
 125 
There has been almost no detailed exploration in the literature as to what the 126 
implications of flexible offsetting might be from an ecological perspective, i.e. the 127 
potential responses of a given ecosystem in absorbing internal exchange between 128 
different biodiversity components. Whilst mentioned by Habib et al. (2013), they 129 
focus rather on economic efficiency and a static analysis of flexible offsetting – so the 130 
ecological outcomes in relation to ecosystem dynamics are not considered. 131 
Otherwise, the degree to which existing problems with any biodiversity offset scheme 132 
are further complicated by allowing flexibility have yet to be understood (e.g. required 133 
longevity in the face of ecosystem change, the existence of ecological thresholds, 134 
potential for reversibility, complications around time lags and extinction debt, etc; Bull 135 
et al., 2013a). In terms of conservation science and the acceptability of flexible 136 
offsets to different stakeholders, such considerations are open to exploration. 137 
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 138 
A comprehensive categorization of flexibility in offsets would be useful for developing 139 
conservation policy, in terms of both identifying and managing the different forms of 140 
flexibility that might arise in on-the-ground offsetting applications. We attempt to 141 
summarize the various ways in which offsets can be flexible. To date, the only 142 
empirical assessments of the ecological implications of a spatially flexible offsetting 143 
policy have been at the landscape scale and implemented using the Marxan 144 
conservation planning software to prioritize offset locations (Kiesecker et al., 2009; 145 
Habib et al., 2013). Here, building upon our categorisation of flexibility in offsets, we 146 
consider the ecological implications of a flexible policy through time. To do so, we 147 
extend an existing theoretical biodiversity offset model (developed by Bull et al., 148 
2014a), and so explore some of the categories of flexible offsetting identified. 149 
 150 
 151 
2. Material and methods 152 
In order to explore the application of a flexible offsetting policy, we first classify 153 
different types of flexibility that could theoretically arise in offset policies, using a 154 
framework based upon a top-down literature synthesis (Moilanen et al., 2014; see 155 
below). Then, we explore the consequences of allowing flexibility by adapting the 156 
simulation model originally created for evaluation of biodiversity offset projects 157 
against different frames of reference (i.e. counterfactuals – the trajectory that an 158 
ecosystem would have followed under different management scenarios to the one 159 
implemented) (Bull et al., 2014a; Fig. 1). 160 
161 
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 162 
Fig. 1: Flow diagram illustrating the logic of the methods applied in this paper. 163 
 164 
 165 
2.1 Different types of flexibility 166 
A framework recently developed for the structured analysis of conservation strategies, 167 
among other things, specifies questions that can be answered to summarize the 168 
properties of such strategies (Moilanen et al., 2014). We utilise this framework to 169 
categorise flexibility in offsets. This involved the creation of two tables: the first table 170 
concerns nine “basic properties” of offsetting as a strategy (e.g. ‘why’ offsets are 171 
used, ‘what’ they involve, etc). We considered the ways in which flexibility could arise 172 
in each of these basic categories. The second table draws upon the first and upon 173 
simulation model outcomes, relating to a set of topics that capture “fundamental 174 
properties” of conservation strategies (e.g. what are their major underlying 175 
assumptions, risks, etc). In the discussion, we explore how feasible flexible offsetting 176 
is as an approach given these properties. 177 
 178 
In order to evaluate how these various properties manifest themselves as forms of 179 
flexibility in actual biodiversity offset policies, we draw upon recent assessments in 180 
the literature, concerning the global development of biodiversity offset policies. 181 
 182 
 183 
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2.2 Theoretical biodiversity offset model 184 
The theoretical offset model (henceforth the ‘model’) is based on a model originally 185 
developed to explore issues around evaluation of offset performance (Bull et al., 186 
2014a). Here, we extend this model to consider multiple different biodiversity sub-187 
components that together constitute the total biodiversity in a region, which in turn 188 
allows the modelling of flexible offset trades (see Section 2.3). The model is based 189 
on analytic equations and is deterministic and non-spatial. It simulates the evolution 190 
of the total hypothetical biodiversity value in a region over time, which is broken down 191 
into biodiversity impacted by development, biodiversity managed as an offset, and 192 
the remaining biodiversity (which is assumed unmanaged). Conceptually, we 193 
considered our biodiversity surrogate to be a metric that measures the condition and 194 
area of different vegetation communities, as this is a common metric used in 195 
biodiversity offset policies (Quétier & Lavorel, 2012). For example in Victoria 196 
Australia, the Habitat Hectares metric used to measure condition x area of vegetation, 197 
where condition is measured relative to a pristine example of that vegetation 198 
community (Parkes et al., 2003). As an illustration of the consequences of flexible 199 
offsets, we use real data for three different vegetation communities under threat from 200 
development around Melbourne, Australia which are labelled as ecological 201 
vegetation classes (EVCs): Plains Grassy Woodland, Damp Heathland, and 202 
Blackthorn Scrub (Table 1). Biodiversity in each of these three EVCs can have a 203 
different trajectory over time depending on its status in the model which can be one 204 
of the following: developed (all vegetation removed), offset (vegetation assumed 205 
managed) or unmanaged (vegetation potentially available for offsetting or 206 
development, but unmanaged and gradually declining in condition). 207 
 208 
The base quantity in the model is the total biodiversity value at a time t, given by B(t), 209 
which is determined by three basic functions: dev(t), the amount of biodiversity lost to 210 
development over time; off(t), the gain in biodiversity from offsets over time (in 211 
response to development); and T(t), which describes the underlying biodiversity 212 
trajectory that occurs when biodiversity is not developed or managed. It is split into 213 
three different EVCs as mentioned above, and for each EVC, B(t) can be considered 214 
analogous to the condition of the vegetation community multiplied by its area 215 
(“condition-area”) as measured by the Habitat Hectares metric (Parkes et al., 2003). 216 
In the absence of development and offsetting the biodiversity trajectory is given by: 217 
 218 
B(t)=T(t)´B0  219 
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[Eqtn 1] 220 
where B0 represent the initial amount of biodiversity and T(t) represents the decline 221 
trajectory of unmanaged vegetation (further information below).  222 
 223 
With both development and offsetting, the biodiversity trajectory can be written as: 224 
 225 
B(t)=T(t)´[B0 -dev(t)]+[p(t)´off (t)].  226 
[Eqtn 2] 227 
Here dev(t) represents the area of biodiversity lost to development each year and 228 
off(t) represents the area protected and managed as offsets each year in response to 229 
development. The term m is the offset multiplier which determines the size of the 230 
offset for each unit of impact. The function p(t) specifies how the (protected) 231 
biodiversity contained in offset locations changes over time in response to offset 232 
actions. For ease of interpretation we assumed that biodiversity managed within the 233 
offset remained constant in constant condition (i.e. p(t) = 1). Once created, we 234 
assumed that offsets are managed indefinitely, and make the simplifying assumption 235 
that the ecosystem returns to its pristine condition as soon as the offset are 236 
implemented and that they stay in this condition due to effective management 237 
irrespective of whatever form T(t) takes. 238 
 239 
In the absence of any intervention, we assume that biodiversity in the region is 240 
characterised by a slow logistic deterioration in condition, which approximately 241 
reflects the reality in the Melbourne region (Gordon et al., 2011a). It should be noted 242 
that in the null counterfactual scenario – i.e. without development or offsetting – 243 
biodiversity will nevertheless decline, and so offsetting aimed at achieving “no net 244 
loss” with respect to this counterfactual biodiversity trajectory would need only to 245 
achieve this same trajectory (which represents a gain with respect to biodiversity 246 
declines and development). Thus, all results will involve some overall loss of 247 
biodiversity, however successful the approach to offsetting. The model could also be 248 
parameterised such that the unmanaged biodiversity trajectory is flat or even 249 
increasing, but as this is not relevant to the Melbourne region, we do not consider 250 
this further here (c.f. Bull et al., 2014a). The decline trajectory was modelled as a 251 
logistic curve based upon the functional form described in Mace et al. (2008) for 252 
population decline:  253 
T (t) = 0.5+
1
(1+ek1´t ) .
 254 
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[Eqtn 3] 255 
Here the coefficient k1 determines the shape of the logistic function and positive 256 
values determine how quickly the biodiversity component decreases (negative values 257 
of k1 result in improving biodiversity trajectories, but are not considered here). As this 258 
model is primarily theoretical and used to illustrate our points about flexibility in 259 
offsets, we do not use different relative decline rates for each EVC and set k1 = 0.03 260 
for all results presented below. We do not focus upon degradation rates here, but 261 
note that the rate of decline used in designing and evaluating offsets is in practice a 262 
key consideration, as discussed in detail elsewhere in this Special Issue (Maron et al., 263 
in review).  264 
 265 
We assumed development causes linearly increasing biodiversity losses with time, at 266 
a constant rate determined by the parameter k2: 267 
 268 

d e v(t)k2t.  269 
[Eqtn 4] 270 
Different types of development could be modelled by substituting different functional 271 
forms into the above equation. Offsets associated with development were expressed 272 
as: 273 
off (t)=m´dev(t)=m´k2 ´ t.  274 
[Eqtn 5] 275 
The factor m in the above equation multiplies the size of offset implemented for a 276 
given development, in terms of offset per unit of development. In some policies such 277 
a ‘multiplier’ is used to increase the size of the offsets to account for uncertainties 278 
(Moilanen et al., 2009). Here, m is set to 2 for all simulations. 279 
 280 
2.3 Extension of the model for flexible offsetting  281 
General 282 
Again, previously the model focus was upon evaluating the performance of offset 283 
policies in achieving no net loss of biodiversity value in a landscape against different 284 
frames of reference (Bull et al., 2014a). Here, total biodiversity B(t) was instead split 285 
into a set of different components Bi(t), which correspond to the three different 286 
ecosystem types (EVCs; Table 1), with B(t) representing the Habitat Hectares score 287 
(condition x area) of each vegetation community (EVC). The total biodiversity score is 288 
given by: 289 
Bull et al. - 10 
 
B(t)= Bi(t)
i
å  290 
[Eqtn 6] 291 
where the index i runs over the three EVC types. Each EVC was assigned an initial 292 
Habitat Hectares score based upon real data for the extent and condition of the these 293 
EVCs in Port Phillip and Western Port Catchment area around Melbourne, Australia. 294 
A linear development rate of was applied to Bi(t), as in previous versions of the model, 295 
but applied to each different subcomponent (EVC) of B(t) separately. For the results 296 
presented here, k2 in in equation 4 was set to 0.16. For simplicity, we used the same 297 
development rate for all three EVCs, to focus on the impacts of different types of 298 
flexible offsetting. When running the model, condition scores for each different 299 
component waere recorded though time. We then used the minimum Habitat 300 
Hectares score at any point, and final Habitat Hectares score, as a basis for 301 
evaluating the consequences of flexibility.  302 
 303 
Types of flexibility 304 
Of the types of flexibility we categorized (c.f. Results), we modelled flexibility in time 305 
(delaying offsets or development relative to each other) and flexibility in type (out-of-306 
kind). We explored 6 scenarios, including a baseline scenario with neither 307 
development nor offsetting, and scenarios variously combining flexibility in time and 308 
type as described below. 309 
 310 
Previously, the optimistic model assumption was made that offsets occur 311 
simultaneously with development and create new biodiversity immediately. 312 
Biodiversity in any state could be offset and is assumed to revert to pristine condition 313 
once offset. In this version, we modelled flexibility in time by including scenarios with 314 
(i) offsets implemented 25 years before the associated development; (ii) offsets 315 
implemented at the same time as associated development; and, (iii) offsets 316 
implemented 25 years after the associated development. Delayed development 317 
corresponds to the use of habitat ‘banking’ (i.e. policies that require offsets to be 318 
implemented in advance of associated development impacts; Bekessy et al., 2010). 319 
Offsets implemented concurrently with development represent the idealized case 320 
where offsets gains occur at the same time as development. Delayed offsets 321 
represents the more realistic case, in which it takes time (after development) for 322 
biodiversity gains to accrue. Note that in some cases 25 years might be an unusually 323 
long timescale for either habitat banking or for implementing delayed offsets after 324 
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development: this extended timescale was deliberately chosen used so that the 325 
functional influence on biodiversity outcomes was clear. 326 
 327 
Flexibility in type was modelled by allowing all offsets to flow to the most threatened 328 
habitat type available for offsets at any one point in time. EVCs then become 329 
unavailable for additional offsets or development once “locked up” (i.e. all habitat in 330 
that EVC was either developed or managed as offsets). Once the most threatened 331 
EVC is locked up, offsets then flow to the second most threatened EVC, and then the 332 
least threatened EVC. By way of contrast, when flexibility was not permitted, offsets 333 
could only provide compensation in the same EVC in which development losses 334 
were incurred. 335 
 336 
The 7 scenarios modelled consist of: 337 
- S1 (Baseline, or null counterfactual) No development or offsetting occurs. All 338 
vegetation is unmanaged; 339 
- S2 (Like-for-like) Development and completely non-flexible offsetting occur 340 
simultaneously; 341 
- S3 (Out-of-kind) Development and offsetting occur simultaneously, but 342 
offsets are flexible by type; 343 
- S4 (Like-for-like, offsets delayed) Same as S2 except offsets are 344 
implemented 25 years after development occurs (flexible in time); 345 
- S5 (Like-for-like, development delayed) Same as S2 except development 346 
is delayed until 25 years after offsets are implemented (flexible in time); 347 
- S6 (Out-of-kind, offsets delayed) Same as S3 except offsets are 348 
implemented 25 years after development occurs. 349 
 350 
Table 1: empirical data on each EVC, including overall threat status, as well as area 351 
and Habitat Hectare score in the study area 352 
EVC name Overall threat 
status  
Initial area (ha) Initial Habitat 
Hectares score 
1. Plains Grassy 
Woodland 
Endangered 36.35 1817.5 
2. Damp Heathland Rare 41.65 2082.5 
3. Blackthorn Scrub Least concern 20.69 1034.5 
 353 
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It should be noted that we did not model flexibility in space in this exploration, as 354 
flexibility in space is relatively well understood (Wilcox & Donlan, 2007; Moilanen 355 
2013; Habib et al., 2013), and because our theoretical model is non-spatial. Flexibility 356 
in space can be implemented in any spatial prioritization software, by tuning the 357 
extent at which spatial data layers are entered into prioritization (Moilanen 2013). The 358 
expectation is that when localized compensation is required, options for offsetting are 359 
fewer and cost-efficiency suffers, compared to the case in which offsetting is allowed 360 
over a larger spatial scale. 361 
 362 
3. Results 363 
3.1 Flexibility in existing regional biodiversity offset policies 364 
There are approximately 50 regional offset policies and programmes worldwide 365 
(Madsen et al., 2011), although many of these are relatively new. Some permit 366 
flexibility. This includes, for instance, the Biotopwertverfahren offset scheme in 367 
Germany, and the application of Habitat Equivalency Analysis to mitigation banking 368 
in the US – both of which permit flexibility in type (Quétier & Lavorel, 2012). The 369 
Victorian offset scheme (Australia) has been in place for over a decade, and permits 370 
“trading up” (i.e. flexible trading of biodiversity components by type, if the gain is in a 371 
habitat with higher conservation value than losses). However, recent reforms to 372 
Victoria’s regulations also allow flexible offsetting in space, to a much greater extent 373 
(DEPI, 2013). In addition, relatively new Canadian biodiversity offset policy potentially 374 
permits flexible biodiversity trades in both type and space (Poulton, 2014), whilst the 375 
Western Cape policy in South Africa allows some flexibility in space (Brownlie & 376 
Botha, 2009). A new offset policy has been piloted in the UK, which would also 377 
permit flexible trades between different biodiversity components (Defra, 2011). 378 
 379 
Since all offset policies, as far as the authors are aware, either involve biodiversity 380 
banking or permit biodiversity benefits associated with offsets to accrue over time (i.e. 381 
during and after development occurs), they all implicitly allow flexibility in time. This 382 
has not been recognised previously in the offsetting literature. All policies also 383 
implicitly allow flexibility in type, for those species and habitats that are not 384 
represented by data in the analysis. 385 
 386 
3.2 Categorisation of flexibility in offsets 387 
Applying the structured framework from Moilanen et al. (2014) permits a more 388 
comprehensive picture of flexibility in offsets, as detailed below (Table 2).389 
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Table 2. Categorization and basic properties of flexible biodiversity offsets, drawing from a top-down question-based framework for analysis of 390 
conservation strategies (Moilanen et al., 2014), indicating where the outcomes of each category of flexibility are known to have been explored. 391 
Category of 
flexibility 
Example of this type of flexibility in biodiversity offsets (note that allowing flexibility in offsets is atypical) 
Outcomes explored in 
the literature 
Name and aliases Biodiversity offsets can also be known as ‘mitigation’, ‘set asides’, etc. Exchanges are allowed between conservation interventions 
which have different names. 
 
Note that there are difficulties in translation. For instance, direct translation of “biodiversity offsets” into both Swedish and Russian is 
‘ecological compensation’, although in English they are actually a very specific subset of ecological compensation 
No 
Type Physical biodiversity losses (e.g. habitat clearances) could be exchanged for e.g. gains in information (e.g. biodiversity research) 
 
The obligation for biodiversity lost due to development and biodiversity gained due to offsets to have the same resilience to 
environmental change (c.f. for instance issues around requiring offsets to endure “in perpetuity”) is relaxed 
No 
Why The drivers and subsequently the philosophy behind offset policy varies: e.g. in the US it is to create a big market in biodiversity 
credits, in the UK it based around streamlining development and adding transparency. 
 
Exchanges are permitted between offset markets that are driven by different philosophies (e.g. in different countries) 
No 
What One type of biodiversity component can be exchanged for another e.g. one habitat type for a different habitat type, or habitat losses 
exchanged for gains in specific fauna species. This is ‘flexibility in type’. 
 
Trades are permitted between an offsets scheme that is part of a broader ‘no net loss’ policy (i.e. reduced losses against the 
counterfactual), and one that is part of a ‘net gain’ policy (i.e. ecological recovery against the counterfactual). 
Wilcox & Donlan, 2007 
Habib et al., 2013 
 
This article 
Where Development losses and offset gains can be measured on different scales e.g. losses and gains at the project scale (i.e. just 
incorporating the impact and offset sites) versus losses and gains at the  landscape scale incorporating multiple offset and impact 
sites as well as the matrix between them. 
 
Large distances are permitted between development sites and the associated offset project sites. 
Kiesecker et al., 2009 
Bull et al., 2014a 
 
Who Biodiversity components owned or controlled by one group can be exchanged for components owned by another (e.g. biodiversity 
value on public vs. private land) 
Gordon et al., 2011b 
 
When Offset gains are often acceptable even if they postdate development impacts (i.e. the time lag problem). 
If it is treated as desirable if offsets are implemented before associated development impacts i.e. through mitigation banking 
mechanisms – even if conservation priorities are changing in the interim.  
This article 
How Different means for achieving additional biodiversity value are treated as interchangeable e.g. restoration vs. protection resulting in 
gains from avoided loss. 
No 
Defining 
characteristics 
Biodiversity offset credits can be exchanged between schemes that have slightly different defining characteristics, e.g. a No Net 
Loss policy and a ‘Net Positive Impact’ policy 
No 
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Biodiversity offsets can be given various different names, such as for instance 392 
‘habitat credit trading’ or ‘complementary remediation’ (Madsen et al., 2011). Further, 393 
biodiversity offsets might be translated only approximately into other languages: e.g. 394 
the phrase translates into both Swedish and Russian as “ecological compensation”. 395 
Labels such as these, when used to describe biodiversity offsets, might also 396 
encompass other conservation interventions, and therefore introduce ambiguity. So, 397 
‘flexibility by name’ could arise if exchanges are permitted between offset-type 398 
interventions with slightly different labels (‘Name’ in Table 2). 399 
 400 
Offset projects can involve various compensatory activities, from active habitat 401 
creation or restoration through to preventing near-certain losses of biodiversity 402 
unrelated to the development (‘avoided loss’ offsets), on to provision of resources to 403 
existing protected areas, or financial support for ecological research activities 404 
(Madsen et al., 2011; Bull et al., 2013b). The exchange of direct biodiversity losses 405 
through e.g. habitat clearance, for gains in anything other than active biodiversity 406 
creation, represents a form of flexibility (‘Type’ and ‘How’ in Table 2). 407 
 408 
Different offset policies are created for different reasons – but the philosophy behind 409 
an offset policy is not necessarily made explicit. For instance, Australian offset 410 
policies are essentially designed to add additional costs to clearance of native 411 
vegetation, thus discouraging development in such habitats. Conversely, the idea of 412 
placing any barrier to development whatsoever is anathema in the UK, where the 413 
pilot biodiversity offset policy was rather intended to simplify compensation for 414 
development impacts, and make it more transparent. If offset trades were permitted 415 
between regions with different drivers for developing offset policy, this would 416 
represent a form of flexibility (‘Why’ in Table 2). 417 
 418 
As outlined in the Introduction, the concepts of biodiversity offsets being flexible in 419 
type (i.e. ‘What’ in Table 2) and in space (i.e. ‘Where’ in Table 2) have already been 420 
discussed in the literature (Kiesecker et al., 2009; Quétier & Lavorel, 2012; Habib et 421 
al., 2013). Conversely, the subject of who owns the land upon which offsets are 422 
delivered has received only limited attention (Gordon et al., 2011b). Yet the land 423 
tenure situation determines who controls any value associated with the biodiversity 424 
contained within that region. If, for instance, biodiversity losses occurred on public 425 
land, but were permitted to be compensated for by gains in biodiversity on privately 426 
owned land, then the associated offset policy would be implicitly allowing flexibility in 427 
terms of the control of biodiversity value (‘Who’ in Table 2). 428 
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 429 
We have already indicated that offsets can be flexible in time under existing offset 430 
policies: if a development occurs and is then compensated for with an offset, such 431 
policies permit ecological benefits from the offset to accrue over time, so there is a 432 
time lag between development losses and gains. Such temporal discrepancies are 433 
often dealt with through the use of multipliers, increasing the size of the offset 434 
required for a given development (Laitla et al., 2014). It has been argued that time 435 
lags in biodiversity gains from offsets should necessitate the use of conservation 436 
banking mechanisms, and biodiversity gains achieved in advance of development 437 
(Bekessy et al., 2010). But conservation priorities can change with time, so the 438 
implementation of an offset in advance of the development impacts for which it 439 
compensates may target different priorities than one implemented simultaneously 440 
with development. Both conservation banking and the use of temporal multipliers 441 
(note: which might in practice be one component of the variable m in Equation 5) can 442 
therefore be generalized as a form of flexibility in time (‘When’ in Table 2). 443 
 444 
Finally, offset policies can have different defining characteristics, for instance: 445 
whether the fundamental objective of the policy is to achieve No Net Loss or a Net 446 
Gain in biodiversity; whether the target of the policy is one specific biodiversity 447 
component or many; whether the policy targets biological diversity, ecosystem 448 
services or ecosystem function; and so on (IFC, 2012; Bull et al., 2013a). Any 449 
attempt to allow trades of offset credits between regions whose offset policies have 450 
different characteristics would represent another form of flexibility (‘Defining 451 
Characteristics’ in Table 2). 452 
 453 
3.3 Model outcomes 454 
To reiterate, in principle, the aim of offset policies such as the one we model here is 455 
generally to achieve no net loss of biodiversity (here, treated as condition x area of 456 
three EVCs) relative to a given baseline. For all results presented here we show 457 
trajectory of the Habitat Hectares score for each of the three EVCs, as well as the 458 
trajectory of total biodiversity which comprised the sum of the Habitat Hectares score 459 
for the three EVCs. S1 was the baseline, comprising neither development nor 460 
offsetting, with all EVCs unmanaged and consequently declining in condition. We 461 
compared the other scenarios to S1 to determine the extent to which they resulted in 462 
no-net-loss, or a net gain relative to this baseline.  463 
 464 
Fig. 2a shows the results of the S1, with declines due solely to background habitat 465 
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deterioration. The results of non-flexible (like-for-like) offsetting are presented in Fig. 466 
2b. Fig. 2c shows a breakdown of different model components for EVC1, with 467 
separate lines for the HH score of vegetation developed, offset, and available for 468 
development or offsetting. Along with background deterioration, these processes 469 
together result in the overall condition trajectory (i.e. solid line in Fig. 2c). Offsetting 470 
that is non-flexible by type (like-for-like) results in gains relative to the baseline S1 471 
(Table 3). 472 
 473 
Flexibility in type 474 
Allowing trades to be flexible between EVCs resulted in different ecological outcomes. 475 
Under a non-flexible policy, losses and gains are exchanged within type, so the 476 
proportion of each habitat ends up remaining approximately constant (Fig. 2b). In Fig. 477 
2d the flexible (out-of-kind) scenario is shown (S3) where all offsets first flow to EVC2, 478 
and when EVC2 is locked up after approximately 30 years offsets flow to EVC1, and 479 
finally to the least threatened  EVC3. In distributing offset gains across different 480 
habitat types, EVC2 and EVC3 suffered proportionally greater losses, while EVC1 481 
benefited (Fig. 2d, Table 3).  Even though the impacts on individual EVCs differed 482 
between S2 and S3, the impact on summed HH score across all EVCs in terms of 483 
both the minimum score reached and score at the 150 years was similar (Table 3).  484 
 485 
Flexibility in time 486 
The results for allowing flexibility in time, but not type, are shown in Fig. 3 – that is, 487 
delaying offsets relative to development (Fig 3a) and delaying development relative 488 
to offsets (Fig 3b). These delays did not affect final HH score of all EVCs combined 489 
at 150 years (Table 3), however, did effect the minimum HH score that occurred. 490 
Delaying offsets resulting in a lower minimum score compared to delaying 491 
development (Fig 3; Table 3). This same trend was reflected in the trajectories of the 492 
individual EVCs. This result is partly intuitive, as creating biodiversity gains to pre-493 
empt losses provides gains in advance of development, resulting in a lessening of 494 
the impact of development over time. However, the final score for each EVC was the 495 
same irrespective of whether offsets or development were delayed, becuase our 496 
model assumes the same offset benefits can accrue irrespective of the vegetation 497 
condition when the offsets are implemented. Thus, while delayed offsets means an 498 
initially greater overall impact from development, the offset eventually results in the 499 
same gains, meaning that the net result over time is the same. However, delaying 500 
offsets in this way could result in a bottleneck, where EVC condition score drops to a 501 
low value before the offsets gains can increase it again.  502 
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 503 
Fig. 2: Results from the offset model showing (a) the baseline scenario (S1) with no 504 
offsetting and no development (b) like-for-like offsetting (c) the individual component 505 
that comprise the trajectory for EVC1 for like-for-like offsetting (c) out-of-kind 506 
offsetting of permitting flexibility in type.  507 
 508 
 509 
 510 
 511 
Fig. 3: Like-for-like offset trades that flexible in time but not type. (a) offsets delayed 512 
by 25 years relative to development (b) development delayed by 25 years relative to 513 
offsets.  514 
 515 
 516 
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Flexibility in both time and in type 517 
Figure 4 show the situation S6 where offsets are permitted to be flexible in both type 518 
and time, i.e. out-of-kind offsetting where offsets are delayed relative to development 519 
(Fig. 4). When flexibility in both type and time was permitted in the model, varied in 520 
terms of the final score and minim scores for each EVC and summed score over all 521 
EVC. (Fig. 4; Table 3).  522 
 523 
Fig. 4. Combining flexibility in both type and time. Out-of-kind offsetting, with offsets 524 
delayed by 25 years relative to development.  525 
 526 
Table 3. Summary results for all 6 scenarios, individual EVCs and summed EVCs. 527 
Min score = minimum Habitat Hectare score reached during the 150-year simulation 528 
period. End score = Habitat Hectares score after the 150-year simulation period. 529 
 530 
Scenario EVC 1 EVC2 EVC3 All 
 Min 
score 
End 
score 
Min 
score 
End 
score 
Min 
score 
End 
score 
Min 
score 
End 
score 
S1 (Null counterfactual) 39.9 39.9 45.8 45.8 22.7 22.7 108.4 108.4 
S2 (Non-flexible) 1022.6 1212.8 1121.6 1388.8 659.4 691.1 2837.1 3292.7 
S3 (Flexible by type, 
non-flexible by time) 
1453.9 1536.5 941.5 1456.0 72.1 270.5 2744.0 3263.0 
S4 (Non-flexible by 
type, offsets delayed) 
768.3 1212.8 853.4 1388.8 459.7 691.1 2143.9 3292.7 
S5 (Non-flexible by 
type, development 
1098.3 1212.8 1189.9 1388.8 690.7 691.1 3019.4 3292.7 
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delayed) 
S6 (Flexible by type, 
offsets delayed) 
1013.1 1344.9 547.5 1937.7 7.0 324.2 2101.2 3606.9 
 531 
Influence of degradation rates 532 
Different degradation rates were explored in simulation runs. Due to the functional 533 
form of the equations used in the model, the rate of degradation did not qualitatively 534 
influence final simulation outcomes for each EVC, as all impacts were eventually fully 535 
offset. However, the degradation rate was found to alter the severity of the decline in 536 
the interim. 537 
 538 
 539 
4. Discussion 540 
The primary objectives of this paper were to provide a structured categorisation of 541 
different types of flexibility in biodiversity offsets and begin exploring the ecological 542 
outcomes of allowing flexibility in time and type. We find that there are a number of 543 
categories of potential flexibility in offsets that have not to date been explicitly 544 
considered in the literature on offsetting, and that allowing flexibility can have 545 
important consequences from the perspective of biodiversity conservation. 546 
 547 
4.1 The importance of classifying different types of flexibility in offsetting 548 
There are a number of reasons why it is beneficial to understand different types of 549 
flexibility in offsetting. From a policymakers perspective, it allows a methodical 550 
consideration of flexibility in developing new offset policy, and clarifies where existing 551 
policies implicitly permit allow certain types of flexibility (e.g. habitat banking). The 552 
categorisation provided here highlights those topics necessary for consideration as 553 
offsets become more widespread (e.g. ‘Who’ - public versus private ownership of 554 
biodiversity value). Further, the topics identified here should become focal areas for 555 
offset policy if and when offset credits begin to be traded internationally (e.g. ‘Name’, 556 
‘Why’, ‘Defining Characteristics’). Finally, our categorisation of flexibility here 557 
suggests the need for an explicit consideration of change and resilience in 558 
biodiversity offsetting (c.f. Table 2), which, despite having been partly explored in 559 
theory via new methodological approaches (e.g. Pouzols & Moilanen, 2013) remains 560 
something of a gap in offset implementation (Bull et al., 2013b). 561 
 562 
Beyond the interest from a policy perspective, it is necessary to categorize flexibility 563 
for the research community as well. For instance, in order to progress robust 564 
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evaluation of the use of habitat banking and the achievement of biodiversity gains in 565 
advance of development (Bekessy et al., 2010), it is important to recognize that 566 
habitat banking arguably represents a specific type of offset trade, in which there is 567 
flexibility though time and possibly across space and type. 568 
 569 
4.2 Implications of flexible offsetting 570 
According to existing research and its extension here, there could be both pros and 571 
cons of allowing flexibility in offsetting. In terms of pros, flexibility in space can lead to 572 
more efficient implementation of offset activities across a landscape, as shown by 573 
Kiesecker et al. (2009) and Habib et al. (2013). That is to say, flexible offsets could 574 
allow better incorporation of ecological considerations into offsetting such as 575 
including species’ behaviour across their full range, interactions with other species 576 
including top-down and bottom-up processes, population or genetic dynamics 577 
through time, and so forth. Equally, Wilcox & Donlan (2007) pointed out the potential 578 
efficiency gain and increased conservation benefits of implementing offsets that are 579 
flexible in space and effectively in type. Bekessy et al. (2010) implicitly point not just 580 
to the benefits, but to the necessity of allowing flexibility in time, as ecological value 581 
can take a long time to accrue. It is pointed out in the context of the RobOff software, 582 
that comparatively higher offset ratios (multipliers) are needed when a stronger form 583 
of sustainability, implying less flexibility, is assumed in the offsetting model (Pouzols 584 
& Moilanen 2013). 585 
 586 
We have also highlighted some pitfalls associated with flexible offsetting. For 587 
instance: allowing flexibility by ‘type’ could lead to some habitat types losing out, if 588 
not adequately coordinated across the landscape. In particular, trading up could 589 
result in relatively heavy losses of more common habitat types overall (Fig. 2, Table 590 
3), which could perversely result in those becoming more limited in spatial extent and 591 
hence threatened over time. Equally, allowing flexibility in time can either lead to 592 
undesirable time lags in the compensation of lost biodiversity value (Fig. 3), or 593 
potentially to compensation via outdated conservation priorities – because 594 
ecosystems are inherently dynamic and subject to change, and so conservation 595 
targets may change over the course of decades. The former issue can be managed 596 
through temporal discounting (c.f. Overton et al., 2012; Pouzols et al. 2012; Laitila et 597 
al. 2014), but the latter is a more subtle issue and perhaps difficult to circumvent. 598 
Allowing flexibility in space can lead to more coordinated conservation area networks 599 
at the landscape level. It can also facilitate avoidance of threats to biodiversity. 600 
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However, it could also lead to problems in those areas where maintaining highly 601 
localised access to habitat patches is a key concern for stakeholders (e.g. the UK). 602 
 603 
The categorisation we provide here draws attention to further considerations, 604 
including that flexible offsetting could permit nature to flow out of one region and into 605 
another, which may not be a desirable outcome. Flexible offsetting (in terms of 606 
“Who”) could permit the flow of biodiversity value from public ownership to private 607 
ownership or between different jurisdictions, which would represent a loss in 608 
ecosystem service provision in a region. And, if offsets are traded between 609 
jurisdictions that differ in terms of “Why”, then biodiversity value could flow from a 610 
society that has a certain philosophy concerning nature conservation to one that has 611 
a different philosophy (Bull et al., 2014b). Such an exchange would not be justifiably 612 
tradeable, would concern a type of flexibility that would be difficult to communicate, 613 
and would require an even more ambiguous concept of No Net Loss. 614 
 615 
We endeavour to capture concepts and results discussed throughout this article, 616 
again in the framework suggested by Moilanen et al. (2014), related to the overall 617 
feasibility of implementing flexible biodiversity offsets (Table 4).618 
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Table 4. Fundamental properties, and feasibility of implementation, for flexible offsetting (following Moilanen et al., 2014) 619 
 620 
Topic Flexibility in biodiversity offsets Relevant publications 
Major underlying 
assumptions 
Flexible offsetting assumes that different components of biodiversity can be treated as fungible, if not physically then in terms of 
importance to society 
Salzman & Ruhl, 2000 
Direct and 
opportunity costs 
Direct costs: recent research shows that flexibility can allow more efficient use of conservation funds 
 
Opportunity costs: not applicable 
Wilcox & Donlan, 2007; Bull 
et al., 2013b; Habib et al., 
2013 
Data needs and 
availability 
Demonstration of no net loss when allowing flexibility in time, type or space requires sufficient data to apply detailed biodiversity 
metrics. This information is not always available. When using a refined set of biodiversity features in analysis, data would rarely be 
available. More flexible offsetting demands more data, because data is required to specify the tradeoffs and preferences that allow 
flexibility.  
 
Conversely, flexibility is in practice is sometimes permitted in terms of carrying out research in exchange for impacts upon those 
biodiversity components for which no data are available. Data availability is not required in this instance. 
 
Walker et al., 2009 
 
 
 
IFC (2012) 
Other constraints Biodiversity offsets require technical expertise and ecological knowledge. Those implementing offsets do not always have access to 
these resources.  
- 
Risks, unintended 
consequences 
As illustrated by the simulation modelling results presented here (Figs. 2 - 4), flexible offsetting could potentially lead to unintended 
changes in the conservation status of certain biodiversity components e.g. more common habitats.  
 
In addition, the offsetting approach in general can lead to a variety of unintended consequences through perverse incentives. 
This article 
 
 
Gordon et al., in review 
Uncertainty Extensive uncertainties exist with the implementation of even non-flexible biodiversity offsetting, hence the need for multipliers. 
Allowing flexible offsetting requires an additional level of value judgements to be made (e.g. in defining exchange rules), bringing in 
additional elements of human decision uncertainty. 
 
Moilanen et al., 2009; Kujala 
et al., 2013; Pouzols & 
Moilanen., 2013 
Conflicts (with 
other land uses or 
strategies) 
As outlined in a forthcoming paper, biodiversity offsetting in general can lead to competition in terms of both land and financial 
resources available for other conservation strategies. However, it is not clear if competition is increased by allowing flexibility in 
offsetting. 
Gordon et al., in review 
Synergies (with 
other land uses or 
strategies) 
Biodiversity offsets that are flexible have been argued to potentially present a useful framework for relatively novel, ‘dynamic’ 
approaches to conservation, such as mobile protected areas. 
 
Can be used to buffer existing protected areas, and in this and similar ways support conservation networks. 
Bull et al., 2013b 
Overall feasibility Given sufficient resources (expertise, finance, space, data) flexible offsets are feasible. However, feasibility depends upon relevant 
stakeholders being sufficiently convinced that creating an artificial fungibility in biodiversity trades is acceptable. 
- 
Related 
alternatives 
(a) Earlier stages in the mitigation hierarchy (i.e. avoidance, minimization or restoration of biodiversity impacts), (b) non-flexible 
biodiversity offsetting, (c) prevention of development that results in significant biodiversity impacts. 
- 
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4.3 Further work 621 
As far as we are aware, this paper categorises flexibility in biodiversity offset 622 
schemes specifically for the first time. It also illustrates elements of flexibility using a 623 
theoretical model of offsetting. There are a number of further research directions that 624 
are suggested in relation to the modelling work. First, in this simple exploration, we 625 
present results involving only three habitat types. The analysis could feasibly be 626 
extended to show outcomes for a larger range of EVCs, representing a more realistic 627 
landscape, of even for cases where out-of-kind offsetting results in trades between 628 
gains and impacts on vegetation communities and individual fauna species. 629 
 630 
As discussed, spatial flexibility in offsetting has been recently explored in other 631 
papers (e.g. Moilanen, 2013; Habib et al., 2013). The notion is not complicated in 632 
implementation, but the outcomes will likely be highly case-specific. Here provide an 633 
exploration of temporal flexibility and flexibility in type, but our model is non-spatial. 634 
The interaction between all three types of flexibility would be interesting to explore. 635 
 636 
To reflect the situation in Victoria, we assumed in this version of the model that there 637 
was background trajectory of deterioration in EVC condition across the landscape. It 638 
is not the case in all regions that offsets are implemented for habitat types that are 639 
degrading with time, e.g. Europe, where offsets are implemented for impacts upon 640 
protected areas (Tucker et al., 2013). As such, the simulations could be repeated 641 
using different background trajectories, including those that are qualitatively stable or 642 
even improving. It should be noted that this has already been partly explored for 643 
offsetting, although not in the context of flexibility (Bull et al. 2014a). 644 
 645 
The issue of whether to allow flexibility links not only to conservation value, but also 646 
to the social objective of the offset scheme, which has not been explored here. For 647 
instance, a common requirement of conservation interventions might be ensuring 648 
human access to nature. Such an objective might provide a different argument for 649 
requiring spatially constrained (non-flexible) offsets, if that means that offset locations 650 
are closer to transport infrastructure or urban centres. 651 
 652 
Finally, it would be useful to extend the modelling work we have undertaken here to 653 
critically assess outcomes of other types of flexibility. Of particular relevance to 654 
contemporary debate in the offset field would be to analyse the consequences of 655 
implementing trans-jurisdictional trades i.e. those between different countries (c.f. 656 
Bull et al., 2014b). 657 
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 658 
Trans-jurisdictional trades are one of a number of new directions being informally 659 
discussed in the current development of biodiversity offset initiatives worldwide, 660 
although this has not been discussed in the literature. We have shown here how this 661 
would reflect just one of a range of categories of flexibility in offsetting. In our view, 662 
flexibility has not been fully considered in practical offset policy and project 663 
development so far. The dangers of not giving sufficient consideration to flexibility 664 
include that some ecosystem components could be much more heavily impacted 665 
than others, that offset projects could target out-of-date conservation priorities, that 666 
the value received from the existence of biodiversity could flow from one stakeholder 667 
group to another, and more. Our overarching recommendation for conservation is 668 
that all forms of flexibility be explicitly considered during the development of offset 669 
policies. We believe that we provide one useful framework for doing so. 670 
 671 
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